






A conspiracy theory is the interpre-
tative framework and narrative pattern 
which defines political events and wid-
er political processes as the consequence 
of premeditated and deceptively ran-
dom activities, i.e. secret agreements re-
garding the performance of illegal and 
immoral activities (and objectives), or 
their application in accomplishing ille-
gal objectives (see Webster’s New Colle-
giate Dictionary, 1976: 243). To sum up, 
it is a definition which implies a group 
of conspirators or a group which appar-
ently conducts its activities in a secret 
manner and/or performs activities oth-
er than those it claims to be performing 
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* Prikazani rezultati proizašli su iz znanstvenog projekta “Javnost, elite, mediji i komunikacijska 
strategija ulaska Hrvatske u EU” provedenog uz potporu Ministarstva znanosti, obrazovanja i 
športa RH.
Summary  According to results of a survey in 2007, this study analyses conspiratorial be-
liefs in Croatia and their correlates. Conspiratorial beliefs consist of politically controversial 
events and processes in recent Croatian history. Factorial analysis has revealed two fac-
tors: Government conspiracies during the 90’s and Conspiracies of internal and external 
enemies. Based on the ideas of Sloterdijk and Žižek, we can name these Factors – Kynical 
and Cynical conspiracy theories. The first ones are a cheeky and bold exposure of cynicism 
of the power elite: secret meetings with the enemy and trade in territory during the war, 
political crimes, corruption, etc. The second ones are the back side of the public façade, 
obscene reactions to ‘thefts of enjoyment’ in the National Thing.
Further analysis has revealed strong differences in beliefs in conspiracies between citizens 
of different ideological affiliation and different political legacy, and between voters of two 
main political parties, HDZ and SDP.*
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(see Coady, 2006: 2), but the real inten-
tions and/or influences of which may be 
publicly “readable”.1 Nevertheless, only 
a step further we are faced with prob-
lems, since this definition is quite often 
applied either selectively, i.e. only to un-
official statements or more frequently to 
statements issued by those not having 
political power, or it is simply perceived 
as an incorrect theory.
This paper attempts to avoid both 
the acceptance of conspiracy theories 
as “facts” and their mere reduction to a 
phenomenon of modern mass hysteria 
(Žižek, 1999: 6), analysing them beyond 
the opposition between delusion and 
hidden truth. We are interested in con-
spiracy theory as a specific (and quite 
frequent) public interpretation which 
has an impact on the political think-
ing and behaviour of both individuals 
and the wider community. Its primary 
function is to determine the front-line 
friend/enemy and it should, therefore, 
be studied as a manifestation of social 
cleavages. 
Briefly, the objective of this paper is 
to determine the extent to which con-
1 In this sense, a conspiracy theory represents 
one form of the so-called symptomal read-
ing of the text (Žižek, 1994: 10), wherein it 
is assumed that, under the infl uence of the 
undeclared (hidden) interest (in domina-
tion, exploitation, etc.) there is a gap between 
the “offi  cial”, public meaning of the text and 
its “actual” intention, a tension between the 
explicitly enunciated content of the text and 
its pragmatic presuppositions. When inter-
preted in this manner, a conspiracy theory is 
close to the classical ideology critique. Con-
spiracy theories are, therefore, an attempt at 
uncovering the hidden, at discovering a se-
cret, at “shedding light” on the abuse of power 
and obliterating the diff erence between insid-
ers and outsiders (see Ellington, 2003: 443).
spiratorial beliefs are present in the gen-
eral population and its relevancy for 
their political opinion and behaviour on 
the basis of psychoanalysis and the pre-
vious discourse analysis of the historical 
period 1990-2007. This will be achieved 
by means of analysing the results of a 
survey conducted in 2007. 
Psychoanalytical Understanding 
of Conspiracy Theory
At the core of conspiracy theory 
there is the concept of a group of ene-
mies or some collective enemy entity. By 
means of this construction, people try to 
avoid and reshape in an imaginary and 
symbolic manner the trauma caused by 
the experience of the elusive, terrifying, 
and traumatic properties of the Other. 
From the point of view of Lacanian psy-
choanalysis, conspiracy theories derive 
from the imaginary Real, from the ex-
perience of the Real in the Other, from 
the unfathomable gap of radical Other-
ness. This alien traumatic core as an in-
ert, inaccessible, and enigmatic proper-
ty of the Other raises the question Che 
vuoi?,2 e.g. when communicating with 
the Other: “You’re telling me that, but 
what do you want with it, what are you 
aiming at?” (Žižek, 2002: 155), what are 
your real intentions which differ from 
the literal ones, in other words “what is 
[that] in the subject more than the sub-
ject?” (ibid.: 158), what is the indefina-
ble, the thing which resists interpellation 
2 Literally translated from Italian, it means: 
What do you want? See how it is elaborated 
in Lacan’s graph of desire (1983: 291-295) 
and by Žižek (2002: 155-168), who claims 
that it is a widespread phenomenon in poli-
tics, since every political request is caught up 
in the dialectic which always implies some-






and positioning in a symbolic network? 
It is what Lacanian psychoanalysis de-
notes as objet petit a3 and defines as the 
object-cause of enjoyment. 
What does the Other want? As an an-
swer to this question expressing the “un-
bearable enigma of the Other’s desire”, 
we get phantasm2, an imaginary sce-
nario, i.e. an unsettling explanation as 
to why something went wrong, for in-
stance “why isn’t our society function-
ing”, “who is to blame for our pauperiza-
tion”, “who is exploiting us” – and, in the 
long run, who is stealing our enjoyment. 
“In the case of anti-Semitism, the answer 
to ‘What does the Jew want?’ is a fanta-
sy of ‘Jewish conspiracy’: a mysterious 
power of Jews to manipulate events, to 
pull the strings behind the scenes” (ibid.: 
160). This construction of the enemy is 
the pre-ideological core of ideology con-
taining the spectral phantasm which fills 
the void in the Real, while functioning 
as defence from “Che vuoi?” and, at the 
same time, as the framework which co-
ordinates our desire, as well as the “the 
formal matrix, on which are grafted vari-
ous ideological formations” (Žižek, 1994: 
13). In the sense of the latter, conspiracy 
theory also possesses a symbolic dimen-
sion which manifests itself through a se-
ries of signifiers, specific of the ideologi-
cal context within which they manifest 
themselves, most usually in the form of 
more or less elaborated narratives. 
The main function of the Symbolic 
order, in the framework of which con-
spiracy theories take form, is to make the 
3 A paradoxical mysterious object which rep-
resents the aspects which, in the positive em-
pirical object we are studying, elude the eye 
and, as such, serve as the driving force un-
derlying the desire for it (see Žižek, 1996: 
69). 
co-existence with others at least bearable 
by imposing laws and obligations, i.e. to 
act as a kind of attenuator and consider-
ation generator. It manifests itself as the 
third element which, while it is function-
al, prevents the relationship “between 
me and my neighbours, so that our re-
lations do not explode in murderous vi-
olence” (Žižek, 2006: 46). Therefore, as 
long as the Symbolic order is functional, 
conspiracy theories remain a local phe-
nomenon which reflects the dynamics of 
the interrelation between various agents 
and the modalities of coping with differ-
ent problems. If the symbolic network is 
narrowed down, and its constituents are 
suspended, for instance in the context 
of social anomy or collapse of a certain 
order, the black-and-white description 
technique provided by conspiracy the-
ories becomes more prominent. With-
in such a context, a single moment of 
its temporary complete suspension is 
enough to induce violence, conflict, or 
war.
Nevertheless, in order to enable a 
relatively successful functioning of the 
Symbolic order, it has to be supported 
by the phantasm of its functional com-
pleteness. It is a phantasm which accom-
panies the spectral phantasm of conspir-
acy theories. In other words, we can talk 
about two types of phantasms. One is the 
idealistic construction of society or the 
community, whereas the other is the un-
settling explanation as to why something 
(or everything) “went wrong”. These two 
phantasms – used to express the afore-
mentioned dichotomy – are closely in-
terrelated.4 Under certain circumstances, 
4 Žižek (1996: 87) states that two dimensions 
of the phantasm are “as two sides of the same 
coin: as long as the community experienc-
























on the level of an individual subject and 
a certain discourse, the two phantasms 
may become mutually interchangeable 
as to which will dominate and which 
will be subordinate. A more dominant 
first phantasm will imply a higher level 
of identification with the Symbolic or-
der, and thus more pronounced confi-
dence in official authorities and struc-
tures, a situation which corresponds to 
the context of a relatively “peaceful” re-
production of the existing order, where-
in disturbing factors are easy to neutral-
ize or present as exceptions to the rule. 
The situation where a more pronounced 
dislocation of the Symbolic order, due to 
some Real antagonism, causes the first 
concept to lose its functionality, leads to 
the explanation and, quite often, identi-
fication of the agent responsible for the 
problems, who has the role of “thief of 
enjoyment” (Salecl, 2002). Quite fre-
quently, these social agents may be vari-
ous ethnic, linguistic, or racial minority 
groups, civil associations and organiza-
tions, but also political and other elites 
within or outside the community which 
perceives itself as being threatened. In 
this situation, the dominant position is 
taken over by the unsettling aspect of 
the phantasm which leads to distanc-
ing from and distrust of the designated 
culprits, accompanied by the request for 
their neutralisation and/or removal. 
Such an interpretation of the sub-
ject as split between the phantasms is 
close to Sloterdijk’s (1992) definition of 
the cynical reason as a universal and dif-
phantasm1, it needs to negate its own im-
possibility, the antagonism in its own centre. 
Phantasm2 (e.g. the picture of the ‘imaginary 
Jew’) is the embodiment of this denial. Short-
ly, the eff ectiveness of phantasm2 is a precon-
dition for the persistence of phantasm1.”
fuse phenomenon of the present. Ac-
cording to this author, a cynical subject 
is quite aware of the distance between 
the ideological mask and the social real-
ity, but he nonetheless still insists upon 
the mask. Translated into the language 
of the previous psychoanalytical expla-
nation, this means that, on the level of 
everyday experience, in the course of re-
ception and interpretation of politically 
relevant events, the subject experiences 
a gap between the ideological meaning 
of discourse, i.e. the formal vocabulary 
used to publicly describe the event with-
in the framework of the “stable and well-
functioning” system (phantasm1), and 
premonition in the sense of decoding 
the “actual” meaning of this event on the 
level of political games of particular in-
terest to the actual participants in a wid-
er temporal perspective (phantasm2). In 
this process, phantasm2 quite often ac-
quires the form of conspiracy theory. In 
order to become clearly articulated and 
expressed, it requires an acute experi-
ence of personal and/or collective in-
strumentalization and/or threat, and an 
available or conceivable culprit. In that 
situation, the actual opinion (or, rath-
er, what the critical mass suspects to be 
true) is expressed in order to go through 
a “purification ritual” and establish the 
old or new ideological discourse, i.e. re-
main within the framework of double 
phantasms.
Sloterdijk also differentiates cyni-
cism from kynism, two terms which have 
in common the “motive of self-preserva-
tion in times of crisis”, cheekiness, “re-
leasing the breaks” and “blurting things 
which are not for the public” (118), i.e. “a 
kind of shameless, ‘dirty’ realism” (197). 
Nevertheless, they are the expression 
of different positions of power. Sloter-






ter’s culture and “refinement”, whereas 
kynism is associated with the popular, 
plebeian thought, i.e. the opposition to 
official ideology which is expressed in 
the most plastic manner through sa-
tirical subversion. In doing so, kynism 
acts as “a resoluteness not to let the na-
ked truth that hides behind cultural dis-
guises to elude it” (158). Cynicism, on 
the other hand, tries to reduce every-
thing “higher” to the lowest denomina-
tor, and represents “the masters’ antith-
esis to their own idealism as ideology 
and as masquerade” (118). Since, in his-
tory, it appeared after kynism, cynicism 
may be defined as kynism that passed 
over to the side of power and idealism 
of the governing ideology and became 
its shadow, i.e. its dark side. Therefore, 
depending on whether they are critical-
ly oriented towards the governing struc-
tures and dominant ideology or they 
support them, we may differentiate be-
tween kynical and cynical conspiracy 
theories. One of the primary objectives 
of this paper is to study their manifesta-
tion and characteristics in one segment 
of Croatian history.
Where Do Conspiracy Theories 
Stem From?
The answer to this question can be 
found in the post-Marxist theory of the 
social field which is represented both 
in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theo-
ry (e.g. 1985), and in the works of some 
Lacanians, for instance Žižek (1994, 
2002, 2004, etc.) and Stavrakakis (1999). 
This theory starts from the assumption 
that the socio-ideological space is in it-
self “curved”, restricted and unbalanced 
and that, prior to every positive entity, 
there is a so-called “pure difference” (see 
Žižek, 2004). This means that every so-
ciety is based on an antagonism which 
cannot be “exceeded” or “annulled”, and 
which always resurfaces during traumat-
ic events which cannot be symbolically 
overcome. This theory claims that, para-
doxically, society is “kept together” pre-
cisely by antagonisms and cracks which 
prevent it from being integrated into a 
harmonious, transparent, and rational 
whole. Antagonism prevents the clos-
ing of the social field and the achieve-
ment of complete symbolization. What 
we perceive as social reality is a reaction-
ary creation and an attempt at “taming” 
this radical antagonism, which develops 
its actual manifestations in a concrete 
historical and political process. Rath-
er than being directly given, social real-
ity is always previously established and 
structured by means of symbolic mech-
anisms. The problem lies in the fact that 
symbolization is never complete; it never 
manages to encompass the whole of the 
Real. There is always something elusive. 
Therefore, in order to establish a social 
reality which corresponds to the notion 
of a harmonious whole, it is necessary to 
repress antagonisms. In other words, in 
order to establish it, something must be 
excluded. The aspiration to abolish an-
tagonism is the source of totalitarian 
temptation (see Žižek, 2002: 18). Here 
we can again take as an example Žižek’s 
description (2004) of the mechanism of 
functioning of Nazi anti-Semitism. An-
ti-Semitism perceives the Jews as disrup-
tive elements of the harmonious “natu-
ral” order of things, as alien intruders, 
the elimination of which would make 
possible the re-establishment of a stable 
social organism. According to Žižek, in 
order to understand how anti-Semitism 
works, and also to get a general insight 
into the way social orders work, we have 
to reverse anti-Semitic thinking. It is not 
that antagonism, disintegration, social 
























the Jews or any other stigmatized group 
of enemies, but antagonism and imbal-
ance that comes from the Real precede 
the construction of the enemy. In order 
to develop and interpret antagonism in 
an imaginary sense, society construes 
an image of the Jew, i.e. the enemy and 
projects into it the causes of antagonism. 
That is the image of the Other which 
functions as the return of the repressed 
social antagonism which cannot be de-
picted, but which lies at the basis of eve-
ry society and is projected into specific 
enemies. Here the Real “erupts” as an 
imaginary spectre which haunts reality 
and manifests itself as a concrete con-
spiracy theory, which then influences 
the dynamics of the relationship towards 
the designated enemy.
Therefore, the image of the enemy, 
which in an ideological discourse takes 
the form of a conspiracy theory, is one 
way of “filling out” an empty space in 
the social antagonism in an imaginary-
symbolic manner. Although the antago-
nism is Real, it can only be represented 
in the ideological form of social reality. 
By no means is this to imply that ene-
mies do not really exist. They are always 
present as a potentiality – everybody is 
everybody’s potential enemy, but who 
will actually become one depends on the 
manner in which social reality is struc-
tured in a specific historical and polit-
ical space-time. Conflict is the first so-
cial fact, a sort of constant, a traumatic 
difference society is trying to overcome 
in different ways by means of build-
ing symbolic structures, the function of 
which is to “tame” and/or eliminate the 
conflict in order to make society a func-
tional harmonious whole. It tries to con-
ceal the Real of antagonism, which then 
returns in the guise of spectral appari-
tions (Žižek, 1994: 17). 
To illustrate this unusual logic, Žižek 
borrows an example from Claude Levi-
Strauss (1989), who describes a Native 
American village divided into two frac-
tions. Depending on the fraction they 
belong to, members have a different 
concept of the spatial organisation of the 
dwellings in the village. Members of the 
first group, which Žižek denotes as con-
servative corporatists, imagine the layout 
of the village as a circle of houses which 
are more or less symmetrically aligned 
around a temple in the centre. Members 
of the other, so called revolutionary-
antagonistic group perceive the village 
as two clusters of houses divided by an 
invisible border. The fact which is also 
emphasized by Levi-Strauss is that this 
situation should not be interpreted in a 
cultural relativistic manner, according to 
which the perception of space depends 
on the belonging to one of the groups. 
The very splitting into the two ‘relative’ 
perceptions implies a hidden reference 
to a constant – not the objective, ‘actu-
al’ arrangement of buildings but a trau-
matic kernel, a fundamental antagonism 
the inhabitants of the village were not 
able to symbolize, to account for, to ‘in-
ternalize’, to come to terms with: an im-
balance in social relations that prevent-
ed the community from stabilizing itself 
into a harmonious whole (Žižek, 1994: 
16). Two mutually exclusive percep-
tions are simply two different attempts 
at dealing with this traumatic antago-
nism and its overcoming by means of a 
balanced symbolic structure. Neverthe-
less, Žižek further expounds, “common 
sense tells us that it is easy to rectify the 
bias of subjective perceptions and ascer-
tain the ‘true state of things’: we hire a 
helicopter and photograph the village 
directly from above” (ibid.). The photo-






reality. But, in this way we would com-
pletely miss the Real of social antago-
nism, the traumatic core that is impossi-
ble to symbolize, “that found expression 
in the very distortions of reality, in the 
fantasized displacements of the ‘actual’ 
arrangement of houses” (ibid.). To show 
the Native American photographs and 
expect that the existing perception will 
disappear would be the same as saying 
to the Hutu and Tutsi that they only dif-
fer in physiognomy, to black and white 
people in, for instance, the USA that the 
only difference between them is the col-
our of their skin, to the Serbs and Croats 
that they are divided only by slight dif-
ferences in language and religion, etc. By 
doing so we would disregard a series of 
spectres – a pandemonium which gov-
erns their mutual relations in concrete 
history. 
This phenomenon of facing the trau-
ma in a certain period, which is ex-
pressed in the imagery of an enemy, as a 
“scared thought” caused by the supposed 
conspiracy of the Other, is the subject of 
study of this paper. Conspiracy theories 
are, therefore, symptoms of a fundamen-
tal Real antagonism which manifests it-
self in a series of neuralgic points which 
are fabricated in the Imaginary-Symbol-
ic creations of a certain society.
The question this leads to is, in gen-
eral, what kind of antagonisms in a pos-
itive, symbolic sense are we dealing 
with? What are these wider frameworks 
we could, at least, tentatively establish 
in respect to the concrete historical seg-
ment to be studied, wherein concrete 
conspiracy theories would act as their 
indicators and axes? Since we are deal-
ing with a historical period in which we 
are analysing the disintegration of a po-
litical community which ends in war, 
followed by the establishing and struc-
turing of a new one, which later gets 
involved in wider integration process-
es, antagonisms in the widest sense in 
which conspiracy theories should man-
ifest themselves, including what Laclau 
(1991: 59) denotes as the general gap of 
modern societies – between tendencies 
of integration which reflect themselves 
in the need for power acting on behalf 
of the whole community (including the 
threat of authoritarian power) and par-
ticularistic tendencies of different so-
cial powers aimed at the fragmentation 
of the social structure (with the threat 
of chaos, violence, and civil war). The 
fact that the conspiracy theories which 
are empirically studied here are an ex-
pression of this or some other kind of 
antagonism is confirmed by their public 
expression by relevant political subjects. 
Conspiracy theories regarding enemies 
of the state or of the political commu-
nity, which work on their elimination by 
acting both from inside and from out-
side, should crop up in the period stud-
ied. These would be the so-called ex-
ternal and internal enemies which are 
defined from the position of power, i.e. 
from the centre towards the periphery of 
the political discourse. Pursuant to the 
aforementioned gap, such conspiracy 
theories would be communicated from 
the position of unity towards a poten-
tially dangerous and unacceptable par-
ticularity. Moreover, depending on the 
political context, an opposite position 
is possible, which is expressed through 
criticism of the Government or domi-
nant political agents in the activities of 
which conspiracy theories find tenden-
cies of deliberate restriction of freedoms 
and rights, usurpation of power and ille-
gitimacy of its operation, manipulation 

























1. According to the previous analysis 
of cynicism and kynism, and to the cri-
terion of expressing the basic social an-
tagonism, cynical conspiracy theories 
would support the integration and ho-
mogenisation of the community, as well 
as totalitarian and authoritarian power. 
These are theories which speak from the 
position of (or on behalf of) the centre 
of political power, and strive to protect 
a monolithically conceived system and 
a certain form of organically conceived 
community. This is not an instance of 
non-reflexive dogmatism, as it may seem 
at first sight, but rather a way of func-
tioning of cynicism in conditions that 
are perceived as a crisis. Cynicism usu-
ally functions according to the formu-
la: “They know very well what they are 
doing, but still, they are doing it”, which 
means that it is manifested as hypocrisy 
in the interpretation of political events 
– by means of declarative acceptance of 
public interpretations and guessing the 
“true” motives and goals of the partici-
pants, which is a fertile ground for inter-
pretation through conspiracy theories. 
When the situation is perceived as dan-
gerous, or is just represented that way, 
conspiracy theories start cropping up 
among the public, regardless of whether 
it is an instance of a political group (such 
as a party or a coalition) trying to pre-
serve or regain its own position of power 
and/or implement a certain more or less 
hegemonic project, or of bitter and dis-
trustful citizens. In all these instances, 
public discourse is conceptually reduced 
in order to protect, in the most efficient 
manner possible, the imaginary source of 
pleasure, which is actually the “Common 
Thing”, represented as a live organism.
2. Unlike previous theories, kynical 
theories speak from the position of par-
ticular, fragmented, and, in the last in-
stance, individual powers. They criticise 
the (governing) power elite from the 
periphery of political discourse, point-
ing at cleavages which the cynics tacit-
ly ignore, except when they feel endan-
gered. Although they may be embittered 
by political events, the behaviour of the 
elite and the functioning of the order to 
the same extent as the cynics, they differ 
from them at least by partially abandon-
ing the phantasmatic framework. In this 
sense, they either identify with the ina-
bility to establish a community as a har-
monious whole and with the inability to 
establish a democratic order based on a 
permanently occupied position of pow-
er, and thus either deride these attempts 
or denounce them as dangerous politi-
cal acts; or they sublimate their previous 
identification with the Common Thing 
into an Ego-ideal expressed through 
some kind of democratic ideology, from 
which they later criticise the behaviour 
of bearers of political power.
In the context of analysing the phe-
nomenon and dynamics of appearance 
of conspiracy theories in a historical seg-
ment of 17 years, along with the analysis 
of the frequency of belief in conspiracy 
theories, we will try and examine these 
particular hypotheses by analysing the 
results of a survey wherein we have op-
erationalized conspiracy theories in the 
following way.
Method
A survey of a representative sam-
ple of Croatian citizens of legal age (n = 
1081) was conducted in November 2007, 
prior to the parliamentary elections. On 
the basis of discourse analysis applied 
to texts published by Croatian political 
weekly magazines in the period from 






al interpretations was made of concrete 
politically relevant events, processes or 
behaviours of participants in the politi-
cal life of Croatia, or otherwise regarding 
Croatia. They were used as the basis for 
formulating the initial set of statements, 
which was later reduced due to the re-
stricted space in the questionnaire. Final-
ly, 13 statements were selected according 
to the estimated political relevance of the 
event, and in such a manner as to include 
the conspiratorial behaviour of various 
participants (Table 1). Their linguistic 
formulation in questionnaire statements 
tried to emulate the form in which they 
appeared in the discourse, with neces-
sary reduction for the purpose of this 
kind of research. The subjects expressed 
their agreement or disagreement for eve-
ry statement on a scale which consisted 
of the following levels: completely disa-
gree, mostly disagree, agree and disagree, 
mostly agree and completely agree.
Since we are dealing with conspir-
acy theories which are typical of a spe-
cific political community and well-de-
fined participants in the political life in 
terms of belonging to the (governing) 
power elite, opposition parties, human 
rights activists, foreign agents or inter-
national factors which might influence 
the political life of the community (EU, 
World Bank, IMF) are mentioned in the 
chosen statements, we have established 
a framework hypothesis that these con-
spiracy theories should be structured in 
two groups, namely cynical and kynical 
conspiracy theories. 
Results
Distribution of Beliefs in 
Conspiracy Theories
The first question is to what extent 
do people believe in such conspiracy the-
ories? 
When we sum up only the statements 
that the citizens agree with either most-
ly or completely, it turns out that 93% of 
the citizens believe in at least one con-
spiracy theory. On average, Croatian cit-
izens believe in five politically relevant 
conspiracies. Moreover, the distribution 
of results does not differ significant-
ly from the normal distribution. This is 


































This prevalence of belief in conspira-
cy theories corresponds to their frequent 
appearance in the political discourse. 
Clearly it is not some “exotic” opinion 
of political misfits which is inappropri-
ate for a democratic society, but rather 
points to its common acceptance and ap-
plication to relevant political events. We 
will now examine the manner in which 
opinion is distributed with respect to 
agreement or disagreement with indi-
vidual conspiracy theories. The results 
of agreement with individual statements 
are presented in Table 1.















a) Presidents Tuđman and Milošević 
arranged the division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in Karađorđevo.
10.2 9.8 26.9 29.6 23.5
b) Th e murder of Josip Reihl Kir was 
organised by Croatian extremists, 
to whom the war with the Serbs was 
convenient.
10.7 13.1 43.8 18.3 14.1
c) In the course of aggression against 
Croatia, some great powers deliberately 
undermined its independence in order 
to preserve Yugoslavia.
2.4 4.4 18.0 40.1 35.1
d) Vukovar was sold in 1991 as part of a 
secret plan of territory swap. 14.5 17.7 28.2 21.4 18.2
e) Transition to market economy and 
privatisation were mostly the result of 
conspiracy between the Mob and the 
Government.
1.5 5.1 18.2 34.9 40.3
f) Crimes against civilians in military 
operations Flash and Storm are an 
expression of a carefully planned 
ethnic cleansing policy of the Croatian 
Government at the time.
37.0 25.2 21.1 9.7 6.9
g) Th e International Court in the 
Hague was founded with the intention 
of punishing those responsible for the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, abolishing 
distinctions between the aggressor and 
the victims, and concealing the real role 
of great powers in this confl ict. 
6.5 10.7 26.8 31.0 25.1
h) For more than a decade, the World 
Bank, IMF, and other international 
institutions have been economically and 
fi nancially colonising Croatia.






According to the majority of ana-
lysed texts taken from political maga-
zines, most people believe that an agree-
ment was reached regarding the division 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina between presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević, although it appears that the 
hypothesis of an arranged war in Croatia 
does not have that much support. It is a 
hypothesis which appeared only occa-
sionally in the political discourse and 
was faced with opposition. Consequent-
ly, two other statements which may be 
interpreted as supporting belief in an ar-
ranged war in Croatia – the murder of 
Reihl Kir5 (b) and the selling of Vukovar 
5 Well-known pacifi st, chief of police in Osijek 
(city in the eastern part of Croatia). Murdered 
in 1991 by a member of the Croatian Army.
(d) – do not have majority support. Nev-
ertheless, the support of this hypothe-
sis should not be neglected, since there 
are a large number of indecisive sub-
jects, while at least 30% agree with these 
statements. This is also supported by the 
quite high level of their correlations (ra,b 
= ,53; ra,d = ,52; rb,d = ,42). The idea of 
ethnic cleansing in the military opera-
tion Storm (f) could also be interpreted 
as part of the thought pattern of an ar-
ranged war in Croatia, which is support-
ed by a mild correlation with the previ-
ous group of statements (which ranges 
at the level of about 0.30), but more than 
60% subjects disagree with this idea. It 
appears that, as regards the perception of 
the military operation Storm, there is a 
strong emotional charge with a predom-
inant heroic dimension of this event, 
i) Under the guise of patriotism, the 
underground intelligence pursues only 
its own interests and settles accounts 
with non-sympathizers. 
5.4 9.6 34.6 31.1 19.3
j) Th e so-called human rights activists 
who are recruited from Yugo-nostalgic 
groups and collaborators of foreign 
secret services are Croatia’s most 
dangerous enemies.
14.9 24.5 31.2 16.5 12.9
k) Since the mid-90’s, the parties which 
were then in the opposition have been 
deliberately destabilizing the country 
and endangering its independence.
21.9 28.4 31.1 11.6 7.0
l) Th e European Union is a conspiracy 
of big business, the aim of which is to 
destroy nation-states.
19.0 27.2 27.8 15.0 11.0
m) Far from the public eye and, contrary 
to the desire of its citizens, Croatia 
is attempting to join a new Balkan 
federation through regional integrations.
29.8 29.8 25.7 9.2 5.5
Note: The results are expressed in percentages of subjects. The statements for which agree-
























which prevents confrontation with its 
possible dimension of planned and or-
ganised crime. The strength of this be-
lief may be supported by the fact that the 
trial against the generals is not over yet 
and there is still hope of acquittal. Nev-
ertheless, the awareness of both dimen-
sions is present, which is an important 
starting point for the further process of 
coping with the past. 
The mutually slightly connected 
opinions on the hostility of the interna-
tional community expressed in the ad-
versity to the independence of Croatia 
(c), punishment for the destruction of 
Yugoslavia (g) and economic exploita-
tion (h) are supported by more than half 
the subjects,6 which may be a specific ex-
pression of current frustration with the 
international economic and political sta-
tus of Croatia, but also a more permanent 
anti-Western sentiment, since we are 
dealing with beliefs containing a longer 
temporal dimension. In this respect, it 
will be interesting to see the manner in 
which this group of conspiratorial beliefs 
is structured with the others. 
The last two conspiracy theories 
which obtained majority support refer 
to the internal problems inherent in the 
process of transition to market econo-
my and privatisation (e), which certain 
criminal groups in connection with the 
Government took advantage of, and the 
problem of abuse of intelligence struc-
tures (i), i.e. a sort of privatisation of the 
state or private or clan interests.7 Both 
ideas were strongly present in the politi-
cal discourse, both in the 90’s and in the 
first decade of this century – as an expres-
sion of criticism of the privileged groups 
which, due to closeness to the governing 
6 rcg = ,35; rch = ,32; rgh = ,40. 
7 rei = ,37.
structures and association with them, 
have illegally acquired wealth and/or 
political power. This opinion is the ba-
sis of the cleavage between winners and 
losers in the process of transition, which 
occurred due to a sort of legal and dem-
ocratic deficit as an expression of an au-
thoritarian regime. 
Exactly those last four statements 
were the ideological constituents of the 
authoritarian regime of the 90’s, as ex-
pressed in the speeches of the then presi-
dent (j), his non-democratic actions, e.g. 
in the case of the infamous Zagreb crisis8 
(k), isolationist politics (l) and perma-
nent worry and warnings about the hos-
tile activities of external forces “which 
want to put us back into some kind of 
Balkan association” (m). Therefore, the 
prevalent disagreement with this kind 
of discourse seems encouraging. On the 
other hand, almost a third of indecisive 
subjects may reflect scepticism about all 
four ideas, but also a kind of “phobic” re-
action towards the aforementioned po-
litical subjects. 
The analysis of the prevalence of be-
liefs in particular conspiratorial ideas re-
flects the controversy of opinions on the 
majority of events and processes con-
tained on this scale. Only two theories 
can be denoted as consolidated conspir-
acy theories, the one claiming that great 
powers had undermined the process of 
independence of Croatia (75% support) 
and the one defining transition to mar-
8 Th is was one of the most striking examples of 
ignoring the democratic will of the citizens of 
the Croatian capital, which occurred in 1995 
when the President of the Republic, accord-
ing to his authorities (sic!), without provid-
ing any explanation, refused to confi rm the 
mayors coming from opposition parties. Th e 






ket economy and privatisation as a con-
spiracy of the Mob and the Government 
(74%). There is significantly more disa-
greement and dilemmas as to whether 
other events and processes derive from 
conspiracies, which makes them a sort 
of spectres of society, the existence of 
which lacks consensus. Most of the stud-
ied events and processes are controver-
sial for Croatian society even a few dec-
ades after they took place, which may be 
an indication of certain lines of more per-
manent political cleavages. On the one 
hand, these cleavages would be a reflec-
tion of political events which took place 
at the time and which are further repro-
duced in the future, but it should also be 
examined to what extent some earlier 
historical concepts reflect through them 
and correspond with them. This will be 
discussed in detail further on.
After this analysis of manifest vari-
ables, the first task is to establish the la-
tent dimensions of conspiratorial belief, 
i.e. the structure of more general ten-
dencies, and then examine the further 
world-view correlates. 
The Structure of Conspiratorial Beliefs 
and Their Correlates 
We have conducted factorial analy-
sis of the statements in order to examine 
the wider structure of conspiratorial be-
liefs, the results of which are presented 
in Table 2. The method used was that of 
principal components with varimax ro-
tations, with testing the established hy-
potheses on a number of components 
by which our data may be described in 
a meaningful manner on a first-ordered 
latent level. 
For the specific Croatian conspiracy 
theories, we assumed a two-factor struc-
ture which should reflect two types of 







of internal and 
external enemies
a) Presidents Tuđman and Milošević arranged the 
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Karađorđevo. .786
b) Th e murder of Josip Reihl Kir was organised by 
Croatian extremists, to whom the war with the Serbs was 
convenient.
.771
c) In the course of aggression against Croatia, some great 
powers deliberately undermined its independence in 
order to preserve Yugoslavia.
.450
d) Vukovar was sold in 1991 as part of a secret plan of 
territory swap. .695
e) Transition to market economy and privatisation were 
mostly the result of conspiracy between the Mob and the 
Government.
.658
f) Crimes against civilians in military operations Flash 
and Storm are an expression of a carefully planned ethnic 
cleansing policy of the Croatian Government at the time.
.493























9 The results indicate that we have con-
firmed our previous hypotheses. Two fac-
tors were obtained, which, according to 
their contents, we have named Govern-
ment conspiracies in the 90’s, and conspir-
acies of internal and external enemies.9 
9 We have checked the stability of the results 
on various sub-samples, depending on the 
gender and by random choice of two sub-
samples. Th e analysis by gender resulted in 
congruence coeffi  cients of 0.98 and 0.99. In 
the analysis by case, the results were also 0.98 
and 0.99, which proves a strong stability of 
the structures obtained. 
Now we will try to establish and an-
alyse in detail the hypotheses regard-
ing the properties of the two obtained 
groups of conspiracy theories in the 
Croatian political discourse. According 
to the previously elaborated theoreti-
cal definition, kynical theories would be 
theories regarding Government conspir-
acies in the 90’s, whereas cynical theo-
ries are theories regarding conspiracies 
involving internal and external enemies. 
The first would be a cheeky and bold ex-
posure of the cynicism of the (govern-
ing) power elite – its secret meetings 
with the enemy, trade in territory and 
g) Th e International Court in the Hague was founded 
with the intention of punishing those responsible for 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia, abolishing distinctions 
between the aggressor and the victims, and concealing 
the real role of great powers in this confl ict.
.584
h) For more than a decade, the World Bank, IMF, and 
other international institutions have been economically 
and fi nancially colonising Croatia.
.569
i) Under the guise of patriotism, the underground 
intelligence pursues only its own interests and settles 
accounts with non-sympathizers.
.541
j) Th e so-called human rights activists who are recruited 
from Yugo-nostalgic groups and collaborators of foreign 
secret services are the most dangerous enemies of 
Croatia.
.744
k) Since the mid-90’s, the parties which were then in 
the opposition have been deliberately destabilizing the 
country and endangering its independence.
.657
l) Th e European Union is a conspiracy of big business, 
the aim of which is to destroy nation-states. .685
m) Far from the public eye and, contrary to the desire of 
its citizens, Croatia is attempting to join a new Balkan 
federation through regional integrations.
.592
% of the explained variance 22.4 22.2
KMO 0,776
Bartlett’s test of the signifi cance of the correlation matrix χ2 = 2958; df = 78; p = 0.000






people during the war, politically mo-
tivated murders and corruption behind 
the mask of patriotism. If that was true, 
the tendency towards this kind of inter-
pretation would imply as the basic kyn-
ical attitude a certain criticism towards 
current political achievements and elit-
es, along with setting higher standards of 
democratic behaviour. In this sense, the 
belief in Government conspiracies in the 
90’s would be connected with: increased 
sensitivity to manipulations by the polit-
ical elites, reduced trust in political insti-
tutions, but also increased need for the 
improvement of democratic standards 
by the Government, or, in other words, 
improved diffuse support of the demo-
cratic order. 
According to the psychoanalytical 
hypothesis, the other group of conspir-
acy theories is the back side of the pub-
lic façade, i.e. an obscene reaction to 
“thieves of enjoyment” in the National 
Thing, which are identified, on the inter-
nal political level, with civil society and 
the opposition, and on the external level 
with the European Union, internation-
al institutions, “great powers”, etc. This 
is the kind of cynicism Žižek identifies 
with distancing from the public law and 
its derision from the position of the ob-
scene internal side, structured by phan-
tasms, which is manifested through the 
imagining of conspiracies against their 
own object of enjoyment. If that was 
true, then the inclination towards be-
lief in conspiracies of internal and exter-
nal enemies should be connected with 
distancing from the democratic system 
and loyalty to an organically perceived 
nation. These tendencies could be ob-
served in a reduced diffuse support to 
democracy, political authoritarianism 
and conservative attitudes, as well as in 
the need for the empowerment of an or-
ganically perceived nation in the form of 
a spiritual or biological “restoration”. 
We will examine these hypotheses by 
means of two regression analyses, where 
the obtained factors of belief in a certain 
type of concrete conspiracy theory will 
be used as criterion variables, whereas 
the mentioned indicators can be used as 
predictor variables. The higher the pre-
dictability in the first two analyses, with 
a significant influence of most of the pre-
dictors, the easier it would be to corrob-
orate our hypotheses of the kynical and 
cynical character of the two kinds of con-
spiracy theories. According to non-spe-
cific hypotheses which do not deal with 
the interrelation of predictors, we have 
used the “enter” method of introduction 
of variables in regression analysis. 
The results are shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4.
Table 3. Regression of predictors of beliefs in Government conspiracies during the 90’s 
PREDICTORS β coeffi  cients
Perception of manipulation and recklessness in campaign  .218
Trust in political and social institutions  -.221
Specifi c support of democracy  -.158
Pleading for protection of human rights and discriminated groups  .137
Diff use support of democracy  .086
R  .487
























Apart from the fact that both re-
gression analyses displayed a quite low 
contribution of the variable of diffuse 
support of democracy, which can be at-
tributed primarily to the quality of its 
measurement, generally speaking, in 
both analyses the statistic significance of 
all predictors and the direction of their 
“influence” indicate the accuracy of the 
hypotheses derived. All single predictors 
contribute in the expected direction. 
Moreover, coefficients of multiple cor-
relation and coefficients of determina-
tion indicate that, in the case of belief in 
Government conspiracy theories in the 
90’s, 23% of the variance of results in the 
criterion variable may be explained by 
means of these predictors, whereas the 
model used to explain beliefs in conspir-
acies of internal and external enemies is 
somewhat more successful and explains 
29% of the variance. Such levels of expla-
nation are considered moderate, which 
means that these two groups of theories 
may be considered partly as an expres-
sion of kynism or cynicism. 
Since, within the measured au-
thoritarianism, there is a variable simi-
lar to the variable of diffuse support of 
democracy,10 which proved to be poor-
10 Diff use support of democracy was measured 
by means of the following question: Some-
ly predictive due to its “roughness”, we 
have left out the latter from further anal-
yses.
Moreover, the results obtained indi-
cate the need to extend the hypotheses 
onto the properties of kynism and cyni-
cism and their correlates in order to fur-
ther test and improve the model. Since 
conspiracy theories involve political 
thinking, it can also, apart from being 
a partial expression of psycho-political 
dispositions, be perceived as an expres-
sion of wider values, world-views, and 
political heritage, and partly under the 
influence of variables which are change-
times democracy doesn’t function very easily. 
Some people think we need strong leaders to 
sort things out. Others think democracy is the 
best solution even when things don’t work out 
that easily. What is your opinion on this sub-
ject? Th e potential answers: a) we need strong 
leaders, b) democracy is always the best, and 
c) I don’t know, I am not sure. Th e variable 
in the analysis has been recoded in a manner 
that a = 1, c = 2, b = 3. Th e following, sub-
stitute statement was used within the scale 
of authoritarianism: “Th e thing this coun-
try needs more than laws and political pro-
grammes are a few brave and determined in-
dividuals the people can trust”. Th e subjects 
could agree or disagree therewith on a fi ve 
level scale.
Table 4. Regression of predictors of beliefs in Conspiracies of internal and external 
enemies
PREDICTORS β coeffi  cients
Diff use support of democracy  -.076
Political authoritarianism  .220
Liberalism-Conservatism  .247
Pleading for “organic” empowerment of nation  .148
R  .543






able to a larger extent, such as, for in-
stance, the dominant problems in the 
society which may, as intervening vari-
ables, re-actualize or suppress antago-
nisms expressed through the conspirato-
rial way of thinking. To this we can add 
the influences of political campaigns and 
the importance of which political parties 
are currently in the Government, which 
are in the opposition, and which is their 
preferred communication style.
Additional Testing of Cynicism/Kynism
As part of this approach, we perceive 
kynism and cynicism as attitudes basic 
to political reality, wherein both may co-
exist up to a certain level and refer to its 
different aspects, particularly political 
agents. The hypothesis is that they are 
partly an expression of wider social val-
ues and political world-views, adopted 
in the course of the process of socializa-
tion. The political legacy, as another in-
stance which precedes them and which 
can present another form of indirect in-
fluence on cynicism/kynism, influencing 
thus the perception of political experi-
ence of the presumed inheritors of exist-
ing political traditions as a reproduction 
of previous relations and promotion of 
certain political concepts, depending on 
whether their political parties are in the 
position of government or in the opposi-
tion, may “refract” through both of these 
basic determinants of kynism and cyni-
cism.11 The experience of being in oppo-
11 E.g. those whose family political tradition is 
linked to the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) could (no matter how strange it may 
sound) perceive the Government elected on 3 
January 2000 as a return of the Communists 
and, pursuant to their own imagery, built on 
the memories or stories from the traumatic 
historical period, or their fabricates, expect a 
politics that would, in their opinion, have an-
sition in the period when crucial events 
or processes took place may also have a 
direct influence on the development of 
a kynical attitude, whereas the experi-
ence of power influences the cynical at-
titude. Nevertheless, it is presumed that 
the mediational relation of the system of 
values and the political world-view can 
also make the experience of opposition 
to power more or less prone to such at-
titudes. Moreover, belonging to a certain 
political tradition may directly influence 
the inclination to distrust the historical 
inheritors of the opposite side, and thus 
kynism/cynicism. 
In this sense, the interrelation be-
tween beliefs in certain kinds of conspir-
acy theories and a) the system of values, 
b) political world-view, c) political tra-
dition of the family should be checked12 
in order to establish whether existing 
predictors (from the first analysis) are 
merely a reflection of ideological pref-
ti-Croatian attributes. Th is would be a belief 
on the naive level which may later, on the re-
fl exive, or, as Sloterdijk calls it, refi ned level, 
be strategically applied to political relations.
12 The variable of political experience could not 
be measured in any way, since we are not in 
possession of voting information throughout 
the nineties. The thing that could be done 
with reliable measures is the evaluation of a 
certain short-term effect of the opposition 
experience, which refers to the period of the 
current mandate. The hypothesis is that, with 
control of the variables of political world-
view and family political tradition, the citi-
zens supporting the opposition parties would 
prefer kynical conspiracy theories as infor-
mation resources for the negative evaluation 
of the party in power. We have not examined 
this last hypothesis in the further analysis, 
since, according to the answer to the ques-
tion who they voted for in 2003, the number 
























erence towards certain conspiracy theo-
ries, or rather the historical cleavage dat-
ing from World War II is reproduced in 
the support of particular kinds of con-
spiratorial beliefs.
a) As regards social values, the exist-
ing instruments allowed us to establish 
profiles of the participants according to 
their preference in respect of the three 
most important values. In order to de-
termine the values characteristic of dif-
ferent kinds of conspiracy theories, and 
thereby also the values typical of kynism 
and cynicism, we have applied the logic 
of differences between “extreme groups”. 
The criterion of arithmetical mean was 
used to divide the participants into four 
groups. The first group consisted of 
those whose belief in Government con-
spiracies in the 90’s was above average, 
whereas their belief in conspiracies of 
internal and external enemies was be-
low average, which should represent a 
group of kynics. The other group con-
sisted of cynics, i.e. those whose belief in 
conspiracies of internal and external en-
emies was above average, whereas their 
belief in Government conspiracies in the 
90’s was below average. The third group 
consisted of those who were below aver-
age in both dimensions of belief, where-
as those from the fourth group displayed 
above average results in both dimen-
sions of belief.13 When conducting this 
analysis we were primarily interested in 
the first two groups, in order to be able 
to determine at least approximately the 
foundations of belief in the two types 
of conspiracy theories, and, according-
ly, the values of kynism and cynicism. 
The results are presented in the follow-
ing graph (Figure 2).
When discussing the three most im-
portant values, their order and, partly, 
their contents differ between the pre-
sumed kynics and cynics. Whereas the 
kynics emphasize fairness, justice, and 
morality, the cynics emphasize fami-
ly, fairness, and justice. Although only 
one value is different, the difference in 
the level of support of single values is 
indicative. For the cynics, the value of 
13 Th e groups were of the same size: kynics = 
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family strongly occupies the first place, 
followed by fairness and then by a sig-
nificant slope towards justice, which has 
the least support in all other groups. We 
have to ask ourselves whether the weak-
er support of justice, which is otherwise 
highly estimated in society, is actually a 
reflection of scepticism with regard to 
the plausibility of its realization and an-
other expression of distancing from the 
political order which is trying to estab-
lish it. Likewise, a significantly lower 
support of the second and third values 
when compared to the first is also inter-
esting. Primarily, this difference could 
be interpreted from the position that the 
values of fairness and justice are in sub-
stantial discord with the value of fami-
ly, meaning that if you value family the 
most, you will have to sacrifice the oth-
er two values more frequently (or you 
will apply them selectively only with-
in the circle of your own group or fam-
ily). Also, the disproportion between the 
support of fairness and justice may in-
dicate the belief that it is easy to achieve 
high goals on the personal, but not on 
the social level, since, unlike the sec-
ond, the first level can easily be control-
led personally. Nevertheless, it may also 
point to the existence of a fundamental 
cynical gap between the preservation of 
the public image of personal integrity 
and the perception of the world as un-
just, i.e. as a place where the principle of 
justice cannot be applied instead of the 
supremacy of the power struggle. As op-
posed to this profile of paramount val-
ues, the difference among the most sup-
ported values is least pronounced in the 
group of kynics.14
14 E.g., the diff erence in support of the fi rst 
and the third value is 19 answers in the case 
of kynics, in comparison 43 answers in the 
If, along with the previously analysed 
differences, the most considerable dif-
ferences among these groups of partici-
pants are analysed, regardless of the ab-
solute support of the values, the cynics, 
when compared to the kynics, put much 
stronger emphasis on the values of fam-
ily, nation, and religion, whereas the val-
ues of egality, morality, and freedom are 
considerably more important to the kyn-
ics. These comparisons clearly indicate 
the collectivist pattern of values present 
in the cynics and, on the other hand, the 
universalistic-individualistic values of 
the kynics, which is compatible with the 
presumed logic of defence of the organ-
ic nation present in cynical conspiracy 
theories, and of the democratic order in 
kynical conspiracy theories. 
b) When determining the relation 
between the political world-view and 
belief in certain groups of conspiracy 
theories, we may employ concrete iden-
tification with a certain world-view and 
left-right self-identification. The hypoth-
esis is that those identifying themselves 
with the left ideological pole and with 
ideologies such as Communism and So-
cial Democracy, which are traditionally 
attributed to that pole, will be more in-
clined to believe in theories of Govern-
ment conspiracy in the 90’s. On the oth-
er hand, the right ideological pole, i.e. 
the ideologies attributed to it, such as 
Nationalism and Conservatism, should 
manifest the least level of faith in this 
group of conspiracy theories. The rea-
sons underlying this structuring could 
case of cynics. Th is is only the result of the 
diff erence in frequencies and does not have 
the force of statistical signifi cance, but rath-
er serves as an impressionistic indication, 

























be multiple. They might derive from 
both supported contents of certain ide-
ologies (e.g. in Socialism in the emanci-
pation and development of every human 
being, in Liberalism in the protection of 
citizens from the influence of the state 
or in the Conservative dependence on 
national values which might then esca-
late as fundamental principles in nation-
alism). However, since all world-views 
are actualized within a certain historical 
context, this inclination towards con-
spiracy theories should also be influ-
enced by the nature of political events in 
the 90’s, which represent a kind of na-
tional revolution. Therefore, depending 
on the supported ideology, the percep-
tion of emancipation of national ideals 
and their protection with respect to the 
perception of abuse of power in that pe-
riod will be more or less pronounced, 
which is also the cause of aversion of the 
right and inclination of the left ideolo-
gies towards these conspiracy theories. 
For the same reasons, the inclination 
to conspiracy theories involving the ac-
tion of internal and external enemies of 
Croatia should function in a completely 
opposite direction. The attitudes of some 
ideological groups towards both dimen-
sions of belief in conspiracy theories are 
presented in Figure 3.
The results of the analysis of the 
variance at the level of all groups indi-
cate statistically relevant differences in 
respect of both dimensions of belief in 
conspiracies.15 A post-hoc analysis16 in-
dicates the presence of statistically sig-
nificant differences between Conserva-
tism and Christian Democracy on the 
one hand and Social Democracy and 
Communism on the other as regards the 
dimension of Government conspiracies 
15 For government conspiracies in the nineties: 
F = 30.511; df = 850, 6; p = 0,0001. For con-
spiracies of internal and external enemies: F 
= 17.235; df = 850, 6; p = 0,0001.
16 The Schefee test displayed a risk level of 10%. 
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Figure 3. Beliefs in conspiracy theories and political world-view







in the 90’s. With respect to conspiracies 
of internal and external enemies, dif-
ferences between Liberalism and Con-
servatism (along with nationalism) ap-
pear at the level of risk exceeding 17%. 
The general direction of the results cor-
responds to the expectations, as shown 
in Figure 3. While citizens close to left 
ideologies, who at the beginning of the 
90’s were, so to speak, ideological losers 
and the opposition, express in a more 
pronounced manner their belief in the 
first type of conspiracy theories, citizens 
close to ideologies of the right, where-
in clear tendencies of imaging the na-
tion as an organic whole are present and 
whose ideals are at the same time real-
ized in a threatening environment, dis-
play stronger belief in theories involv-
ing conspiracies of internal and external 
enemies. A small group with a Commu-
nist world-view (n = 8), the members of 
which support in a more pronounced 
manner both conspiracy theories, stand 
out from this pattern. This is not a sur-
prising result as regards the other di-
mension when we consider the nature 
of the Communist order, which “culti-
vated” and quite often made use of the 
categories of internal and external ene-
mies with a specific vision of an organic 
community to which these citizens have 
(presumably) remained loyal.17 They, 
therefore, do not find it difficult to ap-
ply the same thought pattern to new sit-
uations, or even to those resembling the 
previous ones, in which, for instance, the 
old anti-imperialism is veiled with new 
patriotic feelings. The relations between 
certain kinds of Croatian conspiracy 
17 Th e eff ect of length of the socialization pe-
riod is present in this group. Among them, 6 
out of 8 are older than 50, whereas the others 
are older than 30.
theories and left-right self-identification 
are consistent with these results.18
We were further interested in the ex-
tent to which our predictors, which in 
their combination present an expression 
of kynism/cynicism, may be explained 
by these world-views, i.e. ideological 
variables. The question arising here is 
whether they are a reflection of ideolo-
gy and whether ideology manifests itself 
along with them as an independent fac-
tor which additionally explains and con-
tributes to the inclination to certain con-
spiracy theories. With this objective, by 
means of a hierarchical regression analy-
sis, we have included left-right self-iden-
tification as the following step in pre-
viously conducted regression analyses. 
After that, on the third level, we intro-
duced the previously analysed political 
world-view (dummy variables), in order 
to gain an insight as to whether the iden-
tification with specific ideological orien-
tation makes its members more inclined 
to believe in conspiracy theories.19 The 
results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
18 Th e correlation of left -right self-identifi ca-
tion with the belief in Government conspira-
cies in the nineties equals r = -.420, where-
as its correlation with the belief in conspira-
cies involving internal and external enemies 
equals r = .323.
19 The potential objection that this is a vari-
able measuring for a second time the same 
thing as left-right self-identification, could 
be overcome with two arguments. The neg-
ative argument would be the fact that they 
are only partly connected (eta = .56). This, of 
course, does not mean that they explain the 
same part of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Finally, the indicator of multicolin-
earity, the indices of tolerance, and VIF indi-
ces for each single variable indicate that our 
predictors are far from the values critical for 
























The addition of new variables in 
both steps contributes to a better expla-
nation of the belief in conspiracy theo-
ries in a statistically significant manner, 
but this effect is much less pronounced 
in the case of conspiracy theories involv-
ing internal and external enemies. In the 
case of belief in Government conspira-
cies in the 90’s, two effects of left-right 
erance index equals .347 and the VIF index 
equals 2.88, whereas 0.1 and 10 are taken as 
critical values). The positive justification for 
the introduction of another ideological vari-
able is the need for a stronger assessment of 
its mediation influence and the possibility of 
determining the influence of specific ideo-
logical world-views. 
self-identification may be noticed. The 
first one is the partial overlapping with 
the previous predictors (expressed as a 
non-significant reduction of their re-
gression coefficients), which proves that 
they are, only in a minor part, a reflec-
tion of ideological inclination towards 
these types of conspiracy theories. This 
indicates that kynism could be the basic 
attitude that co-exists with ideological 
orientation which, on the other hand, 
significantly influences on its own the 
inclination towards theories of Govern-
ment conspiracies in the 90’s. This influ-
ence of ideology on the belief in Gov-
ernment conspiracy theories in the 90’s 
is pronounced in Social-Democrats and 
Liberals.
Table 5. Hierarchical regression of predictors of beliefs in Government conspiracies 
during the 90’s with additional variables of ideological orientation in three steps
PREDICTORS β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients
Perception of manipulation and 
recklessness in campaign
.230 .201 .209
Trust in political and social institutions -231 -.161 -.153
Specifi c support of democracy -.146 -.122 -.106
Pleading for protection of human rights 
and discriminated groups
.128 .102 .086
Diff use support of democracy .093 .054* .034*








R .490 .563 .601
R2 adj. .234 .311 .348






The introduction of ideological var-
iables into the prediction proves to be 
less useful in the case of belief in con-
spiracies involving internal and external 
enemies. In the second analysis it has 
an even weaker mediational effect (ex-
pressed through the reduction of pre-
viously present regression coefficients) 
and a weak direct effect expressed by 
low regression coefficients. Neverthe-
less, one should be careful when inter-
preting the direct contribution of this 
ideological dimension for two reasons: 
one part of the variance of direct ideo-
logical influence of the left-right self-
identification has already been included 
with the previous predictors, primarily 
in the dimension of Liberal-Conserva-
tive attitudes. Moreover, there is also the 
influence of political experience, which 
may be masked by this variable and can-
not be measured in this research. There-
fore, the variable of political experience 
in power/opposition should be includ-
ed in future studies and, in the best case, 
one should try to reconstruct the polit-
ical kynism and cynicism as a disposi-
tional variable, i.e. a more permanent 
tendency expressed through a series of 
attitudes towards different objects, not 
only with respect to conspiracy theories. 
Still, these results clearly indicate a di-
rect influence of both kynism/cynicism 
and ideology on the inclination to cer-
tain kinds of conspiracy theories. 
c) Interesting results are also ob-
tained with regard to the relation be-
tween political tradition and propensity 
to certain conspiracy theories referring 
to recent Croatian history. The conduct-
ed variance analyses show considera-
ble differences among groups regard-
Table 6. Hierarchical regression of predictors of beliefs in conspiracies of internal and 
external enemies with additional variables of ideological orientations in three steps
* The influence of the marked variable is statistically non-significant (p>.05).
PREDICTORS β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients
Political authoritarianism  .233  .234  .232
Liberalism-Conservatism .250 .228 .216
Pleading for “organic” empowerment of 
nation
.160 .127 .122 








R .536 .543 .555
























ing both dimensions of conspiratorial 
thinking.20 Subjects with an anti-fascist 
legacy from World War II have shown a 
statistically much higher level of belief 
in Government conspiracies in the 90’s 
in respect to those belonging to the In-
dependent State of Croatia (NDH) tra-
dition, both home guards or ustashas. 
The situation is opposite when we ana-
lyse beliefs in conspiracies involving in-
ternal and external enemies. This belief 
is strongest and considerably more pro-
nounced in subjects belonging to the us-
tasha tradition, followed by those of the 
home guard tradition, and finally those 
belonging to the anti-fascist tradition. 
The results are shown in Figure 4. 
These results clearly indicate that 
the belief in two kinds of Croatian con-
20 For government conspiracies in the 90’s: F = 
10.136; df = 858, 5; p = 0,0001. For conspira-
cies involving internal and external enemies: 
F = 11.397; df = 858, 5; p = 0,0001.
spiracy theories is partly an expression 
of the historical cleavage dating from 
World War II. The manner in which it 
has manifested itself, as previous per-
ceptive priming or as subsequent inter-
pretation of the past, is a question that 
requires further research. We can only 
generally assume that, according to their 
historical experience, there existed po-
tentials for such a perception, but a sig-
nificant role was also played by the so-
called idea of “reconciliation” which 
non-selectively rehabilitated the usta-
sha movement, thus making it a posi-
tive point of identification, not only in 
the sense of absolving the patriotic moti-
vation of members of this tradition, but 
also, for some of them, in the sense of 
absolution from identification with Nazi 
ideology, both in the old and in the new 
generations. As regards the preference 
of certain types of conspiracy theories, 
this would imply that specific knowl-
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Figure 4. Beliefs in conspiracy theories and family political tradition from World 
War II







enced the readiness to perceive some 
subjects, groups, or factors as potential 
enemies, but it also presented the sym-
bolic resource for subsequent theoreti-
cal formulation of the relation through 
the vocabulary of the past – particular-
ly ethnic intolerance – as well as the in-
clination to tolerate criminal behaviour, 
“privatisation” of the state, and violation 
of civil rights. 
In order to check which political tra-
ditions significantly influence the belief 
in conspiracy theories and the manner 
in which this influence is manifested, we 
have conducted regression analyses sim-
ilar to the previous ones by adding the 
variables of family political tradition to 
the first group of predictors; later on we 
have added world-view ideologies to cir-
cumferentially check which part of this 
influence is performed through ideolo-
gy. 
The anti-fascist family political tra-
dition and, to a minor extent, non-in-
Table 7. Hierarchical regression of predictors of beliefs in Government conspiracies 
in the 90’s with additional variables of family political tradition
* The influence of the marked variable is statistically non-significant (p>.05).
PREDICTORS β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients
Perception of manipulation and 
recklessness in campaign
.233 .248 .223 
Trust in political and social institutions -.237 -.217 -.156
Specifi c support of democracy -.138 -.136 -.100
Pleading for protection of human rights 
and discriminated groups
.119 .103 .070
Diff use support of democracy .090 .069 .028*
Partisans (anti-fascists) .197 .131
Ustashas (fascists) -.026* .018*
Home Guards (regular army of fascist 
Independent State of Croatia)
-.015* -.005*
On many sides .047* .033*
Out of confl ict .101 .073*








R .487 .523 .611
























volvement in the conflict,21show little 
mediational influence and a significant 
direct influence on theories of Govern-
ment conspiracy in the 90’s. This direct 
influence remains significant even after 
we introduce ideology into the predic-
21 Th e results for particular predictors for 
both types of conspiracy theories diff er only 
slightly in the fi rst step in respect to the pre-
vious Tables 6 and 7. Th e cause of this dif-
ference is technical, since the program takes 
into consideration only the cases containing 
data for all three hierarchical levels of regres-
sion analysis.
tion. When compared to the results in 
Table 5, where variables of political tra-
dition were not included in the analy-
sis, ideological variables display a slight-
ly lesser contribution, which proves that 
they were partly mediated by political 
tradition, but the influence of Social 
Democratic and Liberal orientation on 
the preference for these conspiracy the-
ories is still present. To sum up, mem-
bers of the antifascist political legacy 
and those who identify themselves with 
the Social Democratic and Liberal ideol-
ogies are more inclined towards kynical 
conspiracy theories.
Table 8. Hierarchical regression of predictors of beliefs in conspiracies of internal 
and external enemies with additional variables of family political tradition21
* The influence of the marked variable is statistically non-significant (p>.05).
PREDICTORS β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients β-coeffi  cients
Political authoritarianism .231 .239 .236
Liberalism-Conservatism .248 .221 .196
Pleading for “organic” empowerment of 
nation
.157 .145 .117
Partisans (anti-fascists) .011* .025*
Ustashas (fascists) .127 .119
Home Guards (regular army of fascist 
Independent State of Croatia)
.080 .081
On many sides .010* .000*
Out of confl ict .008* .019*
Left -Right self-identifi cation .065







R .529 .547 .562






The results displayed in Table 8 in-
dicate that subjects with an NDH legacy 
are somewhat more inclined to believe 
in conspiracy theories involving internal 
and external enemies, particularly those 
whose family members mainly served 
in the ustasha units. The introduction 
of ideological variables indicates mainly 
the non-significance of their influence. 
Also, their introduction slightly reduces 
the influence of variables of political tra-
dition and the majority of variables from 
the first prediction step, which, again, is 
an indicator of a weak mediation and di-
rect influence. As expected, the latter is 
manifested in the prominence of Con-
servative attitudes from the first group 
of variables. 
To sum up, these results indicate that 
subjects with an NDH legacy and be-
longing to the right ideological pole are 
more inclined towards cynical conspira-
cy theories involving the existence of in-
ternal and external enemies, under the 
guise of distancing from the democrat-
ic order. 
So far we have analysed beliefs in dif-
ferent types of Croatian conspiracy the-
ories as a dependant variable, trying to 
determine the extent to which they are 
an expression of the kynical or cynical 
attitude, and what is their relation to-
wards more permanent ideological and 
value dispositions relevant for political 
behaviour. The next question is the mere 
extent to which conspiracy theories are 
important for understanding political 
behaviour. Bearing this in mind, in the 
next section we will analyse whether it is 
possible to distinguish among voters of 
certain political parties in Croatia on the 
basis of the knowledge of belief in cer-
tain conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracy theories and 
voting behaviour
In order to determine if there is any 
ground for the analysis of the influence of 
conspiracy theories on electoral behav-
iour, we have conducted a simple analy-
sis of variance in order to determine the 
existence of differences between the two 
kinds of conspiratorial belief between 
voters of particular political parties. Sig-
nificant differences on the level of the 
general ANOVA test were obtained in 
respect to two dimensions of concrete 
conspiracy theories in Croatia,22 but a 
subsequent post-hoc Scheffe test does 
not reveal significant sub-sets for the 
belief in conspiracies involving internal 
and external enemies. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to their direction, the results are 
indicative of both kinds of conspiracy 
theories.23 The results are shown in Fig-
ure 5 (on the next page). 
Voters of SDP and HNS24 are in the 
lead as regards belief in theories of Gov-
ernment conspiracies in the 90’s. They 
differed statistically only from voters of 
HDZ,25 among which the support of this 
kind of conspiracy theory is least pro-
nounced when considering the whole 
sample. In terms of tendencies, these 
and other results mostly reflect the po-
litical cleavages and the relation between 
the Government and the opposition 
which existed in the 90’s (this applies to 
22 For government conspiracies in the nineties: 
F = 25.951; df = 596, 9; p = 0.0001. For con-
spiracies involving internal and external en-
emies: F = 7.984; df = 596, 9; p = 0.0001. 
23 Eta (government conspiracies in the nine-
ties) = .524; Eta (conspiracies involving in-
ternal and external enemies) = .326.
24 Social-Democratic Party and Croatian Peo-
ple’s Party (liberal-democrats).
























parties which existed at the time). Com-
pletely opposite results are obtained for 
the belief in conspiracies of internal and 
external enemies. 
The relation between belief in 
Croatian conspiracy theories and atti-
tudes towards political parties is theo-
retically observed as the influence of the 
first group of variables on the second, i.e. 
parties and their leaders are perceived 
through the prism of events which oc-
curred in the last decade of the last cen-
tury, to which the beginning of all theo-
ries here analysed refers. Therefore, this 
is an assessment of a particular party ac-
cording to its role in the presumed types 
of conspiracies. 
One can clearly notice the extent to 
which the inclination towards certain 
kinds of conspiracy theories “influenc-
es” the attitudes towards political par-
ties26 on the basis of regression analyses 
26 We use them as an alternative variable to vot-
ing behaviour.
which show interesting results (see Table 
9 on the next page). 
The attitudes towards HDZ and SDP, 
main competitors on the Croatian po-
litical scene, and towards parties close 
to them, i.e. HSP27 and HNS respective-
ly, and to their leaderships, can be suc-
cessfully predicted by means of these 
theories, whereas the belief in conspira-
cy theories does not have any predictive 
value for the attitude towards parties of 
the centre, HSLS, HSS, and HSU.
The reasons underlying this correla-
tion can be attributed to the significance 
of information from the past which ap-
pear in certain conspiracy theories as 
the foundations for further evaluation of 
the past and recent behaviour, and as a 
perceptive filter for the prediction of fu-
ture behaviour of political parties. As we 
have seen in the previous section, this 
relation partly derives from the histori-
cal-ideological cleavage in the electorate 
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Figure 5. Beliefs in conspiracy theories and voting behaviour







and the presumed political experience 
in the 90’s which resulted in the current 
political cleavage between left and right, 
understood as the opposition between 
the Social Democratic-Liberal and the 
Conservative-Nationalistic poles.
The assessment of particular par-
ty leaders is in accordance with the as-
sessment of particular parties, and can 
be explained as the projection of rela-
tions between political parties on their 
leaders, which are experimentally estab-
lished. This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that some of them, e.g. the lead-
ers of the two major parties, did not have 
a significant role in the political life at 
the time of the events which are inter-
preted in a conspiratorial way and the at-
titudes towards which can largely be pre-
dicted. A high level of competition, i.e. 
polarisation between the major political 
competitors can also contribute to the 
prominence of these conspiracy theo-
ries, connected with the recent Croatian 
past and the near future, since it may in-
clude the use of conspiracy theories as 
one of the sources of distinctions, which 
is, moreover, linked to the ideologi-
cal dimension important for the origin 
of their opposition. This information is 
not a relevant basis for decision-mak-
ing in the case of voters of minor parties, 
whose aim is to win votes outside of this 
historical ideological matrix of opposi-
tion and which are, consequently, locat-
ed in the ideological centre.
Conclusion
Let us sum up the results of our re-
search. They clearly indicate that the 
majority of citizens believe in at least one 
conspiracy theory, whereas the average 
number is five. Furthermore, the majori-
ty of conspiracy theories represent opin-
ions raising considerable controversy. 
The existence of two types of conspiracy 
theories has been confirmed as regards 
the structure of conspiratorial belief: 
Government conspiracies in the nineties 
and conspiracies of internal and external 
enemies. In accordance with previously 
established psychoanalytical hypotheses, 
we have corroborated the hypotheses of 
the kynical character of the first and the 
cynical character of the second type of 
conspiracy theories. In line with this, the 
first type represents support to the dem-
ocratic order, as a kind of criticism of the 
Table 9. Regression of attitude toward political parties in relation to conspiracy 
theories
* The influence of the marked variable is statistically non-significant (p>.05).




-.485 -.318 -.148 -.008* .048* .038* .181 .271 .333 .395
Conspiracies 
of internal and 
external enemies
.222 .205 .170 .023* -.035* -.073 -.263 -.225 -.268 -.275
R .533 .379 .229 .024 .059 .082 .321 .356 .427 .482
























Government, whereas the other kind of 
conspiracy theories is connected with 
authoritarian tendencies which support 
the “siege mentality”. Furthermore, the 
first kind of conspiracy theories is typi-
cal of citizens with a Social Democratic 
and Liberal political world-view, where-
as citizens of a nationalistic, Conserva-
tive, and to a somewhat lesser extent, 
Christian Democratic world-view are 
more inclined towards the second type. 
Regression analyses indicate that, along 
with the influence of a basic kynical/
cynical attitude, belief in these conspir-
acy theories is influenced by ideological 
orientation and family political tradition 
from World War II, with subjects of anti-
fascist legacy being more inclined to be-
lieve in Government conspiracies in the 
nineties, and inheritors of NDH legacy 
being more inclined to believe in con-
spiracies involving internal and exter-
nal enemies. Further analyses indicate 
that these two types of Croatian con-
spiracy theories have a significant influ-
ence on the attitudes towards political 
parties, which can be useful for success-
ful prediction of attitudes towards the 
main competitors on the Croatian po-
litical scene. Of the two types of belief 
in conspiracy theories, the belief in Gov-
ernment conspiracies in the 90’s proves 
to be the better predictor of these atti-
tudes. This shows that such conspiracy 
theories are relevant for the prediction 
of potential voting behaviour. The use of 
these theories alone makes it possible to 
predict approximately one fourth of the 
total variance of voting preferences for 
the major competitors on the Croatian 
scene. Therefore, belief in conspiracy 
theories referring to the recent Croatian 
past, as well as the development of pre-
dictors of kynism and cynicism as the 
basic attitude towards political reality, 
prove to be predictors which should not 
be overlooked in the future. 
Finally, the results of this research 
clearly indicate that conspiracy theo-
ries are not typical of eccentrics, but 
are rather a widespread way of thinking 
connected primarily to politically con-
troversial events and processes. It does 
not have solely antidemocratic, author-
itarian, and collectively-protective po-
tentials, since one of the types thereof 
functions as a way of “exposing the dirty 
linen” of the democratic order. Moreo-
ver, both kinds of conspiratorial think-
ing are relevant for understanding the 
political order and the articulation of 
political divisions in Croatian society.
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Struktura konspirativnoga mišljenja u Hrvatskoj
SAŽETAK Sukladno rezultatima anketnog istraživanja iz 2007. godine, ova studi-
ja analizira konspirativno mišljenje u Hrvatskoj i njegove korelate. Konspirativno 
mišljenje odnosi se na politički kontroverzne događaje i procese iz nedavne hr-
vatske povijesti. Provedena faktorska analiza pokazala je postojanje dvaju fakto-
ra. Jedan se odnosi na zavjere vlasti u 90-ima, a drugi na zavjere unutarnjih i vanj-
skih neprijatelja. Na temelju Sloterdijkovih i Žižekovih razmatranja o cinizmu, ova 
dva faktora možemo nazvati kiničnim i ciničnim teorijama zavjera. Prvi je tip teo-
rija zavjera drsko i odvažno raskrinkavanje cinizma elita moći – njihovih tajnih sa-
stanaka s neprijateljem tijekom rata, političkog kriminala, korupcije itd. Drugi je 
tip naličje “javne fasade”, opscene reakcije na “kradljivce užitka” nacionalne Stvari, 
u koje takva ideologija ubraja civilno društvo, oporbu, EU, MMF, Velike sile itd. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI teorija zavjere, cinizam, kinizam, zavjere vlasti, zavjere unutarnjih 
i vanjskih neprijatelja, izborno ponašanje
